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1. INTRODUCTION 
The growth in research on the link between trade and wages seems to be abating, 
and the collective prior among economists on the empirical magnitude of that 
link seems to have stabilized around the existence of some statistically significant 
but practically small effect of trade on the decline in the relative wage of unskilled 
workers.  However, important questions remain.  The great majority of both 
theoretical and empirical work addresses the link between trade and wages within 
the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, generalized in a 
variety of straightforward ways.  This tends to focus attention on North-South 
trade, where the Stolper-Samuelson effects would be most pronounced.  That is, 
given substantial liberalization in North-South trade and falling frictional costs of 
trade, the substantial differences in relative commodity and factor prices between 
North and South might cause us to expect large effects.  However, as a number 
of students of this topic have pointed out, the volume of North-South trade is 
quite small, with the, somewhat controversial, implication that the leverage for 
Stolper-Samuelson effects is also small.  Where we do observe substantial and 
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growing trade volumes and deepening economic integration is between North 
(aka OECD) economies. 
 In this paper we make a significant departure from the emphasis of this 
literature.  As with current empirical research on trade patterns, which has 
examined the implications of imperfect competition models, we provide an 
exploratory empirical analysis of a relatively simple monopolistic competition 
model of the link between trade and labour markets.1 Specifically, we examine, 
theoretically and empirically, North-North trade within a monopolistic 
competition model, looking for links between globalization and labour market 
performance. 
Given the ease with which the HOS model yields an estimating 
framework, it is not surprising that the empirical literature on trade and wages has 
derived primarily from competitive models of the HOS family.  By contrast, 
imperfectly competitive models come in a variety of forms, most of which do not 
yield as readily to empirical representation as do the competitive models.  
Nonetheless, this is not the first attempt to evaluate the links between trade and 
wages under conditions of imperfect competition.  The closest empirical analysis 
to that presented here is Borjas and Ramey (1994).  In that paper, the authors 
develop a simple theory of Nash bargaining between a firm and a union in an 
industry characterized by rents.2  Assuming an empirical connection between 
concentration and rents, the authors hypothesize that increased competition in 
concentrated sectors will shrink rents, reducing returns to labour in those sectors.  
                                                 
1 There is now considerable literature suggesting: 1) that the HOV model does a less than 
spectacular job in describing directions of trade; and that 2) alternatives including increasing 
returns and monopolistic competition offer a useful addition to factor-endowments in accounting 
for directions of trade.  Daniel Trefler (1995; Antweiler and Trefler, 2002) has probably done 
more than anyone to advance this position, but the literature is now vast.  Harrigan (2003) 
provides an overview of this research.  Just as these models help account for the directions of 
trade, we suggest in this paper that the same class of models can help us understand the evolution 
of the relationship between trade and wages. 
2 This is essentially the model developed in Brander and Spencer (1988). Alternative models of 
union preferences and of the underlying bargain, raising more-or-less the same questions as those 
in Borjas and Ramey, are developed in Grossman (1984); Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991); and 
Gaston and Trefler (1995). 
 3 
If unskilled workers are concentrated in sectors characterized by large rents and 
unions, increased competition in those sectors will cause the aggregate wage for 
unskilled workers to fall due to: a reduction in the wage premium via a change in 
the bargain; shrinkage in the size of the high wage sector; and increased supply of 
unskilled labour to other sectors.  This structure is used to motivate a discussion 
of a time series analysis of the long-run relationship between net imports of trade in 
durable goods and the relative wage of skilled versus unskilled workers.  The 
main empirical result is that “the durable goods deficit as a percent of GDP has 
the same long-run trend as the college premium from 1963 to 1988” (Borjas and 
Ramey, pg. 226).  The results reported here also relate to the long-run 
relationship between trade volumes and wages at the macro level.  However, the 
precise choice of variables will reflect a different theoretical framework. 
One of the difficulties in interpreting the Borjas/Ramey analysis is that 
the framework is essentially microeconomic, while the empirical analysis is 
macroeconomic.3  As a result, the theoretical link between a broad aggregate like 
trade volume and the economywide wage premium remains quite unclear.  
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) provide an alternative analysis, with a more 
fundamentally macroeconomic basis.  In their model, falling costs of outsourcing 
allow firms to move the most labor-intensive part of their production process 
offshore, with the implication that the relative demand for unskilled labor 
(relative skilled labor) falls, leading to an increase in the skill premium.4  In 
                                                 
3 By “microeconomic” we refer to the fact that the Borjas/Ramey analysis is partial equilibrium in 
nature and extended to a claim about economywide effects by a number of auxiliary hypotheses 
of uncertain theoretical and empirical validity.  A more natural empirical implementation of the 
underlying model would focus directly on the sector level, examining the relationship between 
trade, rents (or correlates such as concentration), union coverage, and wage premia.  Interestingly, 
this is essentially what Gaston and Trefler (1995) do, and their results are broadly supportive of 
models in which international competition suppresses rents that support payment of wage 
premia. 
4 Feenstra and Hanson (1996) are primarily interested in accounting for the fact of a rising skill 
premium in both North and South, so their model is simplified in ways that stress this 
phenomenon.  In particular, they develop a one-sector economy with a continuum of inputs, and 
two countries.  Feenstra and Hanson (1997) focus on the Mexican case, finding that FDI is 
positively associated with the skill premium there. It should be noted that similar implications can 
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Feenstra and Hanson (1999) the authors use cross-sectional methods to examine 
the relationship between the wage premium and outsourcing as proxied by 
measures of intermediate import volumes.  Among other important results, 
Feenstra and Hanson find that outsourcing has a sizable effect on relative wages.  
The empirical results reported here also emphasize trade in intermediate goods, 
though we focus on a more highly aggregated treatment of the economy and use 
time series methods. 
A final body of work closely related to the present paper attempts to 
analyze the trade-wage relationship in a monopolistic competition/division of 
labor framework.  Building on the fundamental work of Ethier (1982) and 
Markusen (1990), Markusen and Venables (1997, 1999) develop a two-sector, 
two-factor theoretical model characterized by one conventional (i.e. constant 
returns to scale) sector and one sector characterized by monopolistic competition 
and division of labor induced external scale economies.5  As with the 
Feenstra/Hanson analysis, Markusen and Venables are interested in North-South 
issues, so their two-country model involves endowment differences as well as the 
division of labor structure.  Within this framework, the authors show that effects 
of a reduction in barriers to multinationalization have ambiguous effects on the 
wage premium.  Using a similar production structure, Lovely and Nelson (2000) 
examine trade between similar countries and wages, Francois and Nelson (2001) 
analyze trade and foreign direct investment between similar countries, and its 
effect on the wage premium, and the recent book by Dluhosch (2000) and the 
paper by Burda and Dluhosch (2002) emphasize outsourcing and relative wages.  
Models of this last sort suggest a connection between the volume of trade in 
intermediate goods and relative wages.  Thus, where Borjas/Ramey analyze net 
trade in intermediate goods and Feenstra/Hanson analyze imports of 
intermediate goods, we will be analyzing global trade in intermediate goods. 
                                                                                                                                
emerge in models of outsourcing based on more conventional trade models.  See, for example, 
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Deardorff (2001), and Kohler (2003). 
5 See Francois and Nelson (2002) for an expository development of this class of model. 
 5 
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we develop the basic 
linkages between trade-based integration and relative wages in an Ethier-type 
division of labor model.  This points to a relationship between integration, 
productivity, and wages. In Section 3 we examine the trivariate relationship 
between trade, growth in total factor productivity (TFP), and the skill premium in 
a vector autoregression framework.  We find evidence of a long-run relationship 
between growth in intermediate goods and changes in TFP.  There is also 
evidence of a positive relationship between trade and the skill premium.  In 
Section 4 we conclude. 
 
2. GLOBALIZATION, ROUNDABOUTNESS, AND WAGE MECHANICS 
We start with an examination of the linkages between relative wages and trade in 
a division-of-labor model along the lines of Ethier (1982).   Our starting point is 
returns related to the international division of labour.  While the notion that the 
division of labour has both micro and macroeconomic foundations goes back at 
least to Adam Smith, and most clearly to Allyn Young, it lived a shadowy 
existence until the development of a number of simple formalisations in the early 
1980s permitted direct introduction of these ideas into the main corpus of 
economic theory.6  One of the fundamental barriers to formalization lay in the 
difficulty of treating the macroeconomic aspect of division of labour seriously in 
a tractable framework.  The macroeconomic aspect of the analysis rests on the 
recognition that an increasing division of labour involves a fundamental 
transformation of technology (increasing “roundaboutness”) at the level of the 
economy as a whole.  In addition, as we are now well aware, any serious 
treatment of the macroeconomic aspects of the division of labour leads fairly 
directly to increasing returns and thus to non-convexities in the feasible set. 
                                                 
6Buchanan and Yoon (1994) collect a number of key papers from both the shadowy early period 
(including the relevant passage from Smith, and Young’s classic essay) and the current emergence 
as a core element of both micro and macroeconomic research.  Krugman’s (1995) Ohlin Lectures 
are a fascinating presentation of the relationship between ideas and models in this area. 
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 The key step in formalizing these essential notions was Wilfred Ethier’s 
insight that the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition could 
be reinterpreted as a model of the division of labour.  In addition to a perfectly 
competitive, constant returns to scale sector, the Ethier model has a sector that 
uses specialized inputs to produce a final consumption good.  Allyn Young-like 
roundaboutness is represented by the fact that productivity in this sector is 
increasing in the variety of such inputs.  On the other hand, the division of 
labour among producers of specialized inputs is limited by increasing returns and 
fixed resources.7  As was clear from the start of this literature, this model was 
characterized by macroeconomic increasing returns as well as the microeconomic 
increasing returns at the level of specialized inputs.8 
We first assume a numeraire good W produced with a standard 
neoclassical technology and employing two factors: skilled labor S and unskilled 
labor L. 
 
 ( , ), , 0, , 0W W L S LL SSW f L S f f f f= > <  (1) 
 
In addition, skilled and unskilled labor can be employed in the 
manufacturing sector.  This involves Ethier-type assembly of specialized 
intermediate goods under a CES technology: 
 
 
1/
1
,  0 1
n
i
i
M x
r
r
=
é ù= < r <ê úë û
å  (2) 
 
                                                 
7This aspect of the model was also essential to the model of Spence (1976) and Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977).  In the SDS model these are final consumption goods, while in the Ethier model they are 
producer goods. 
8In addition to Ethier’s original analysis, see Markusen (1990) and Francois and Nelson (2002) for 
treatments that stress the division of labour/macroeconomic increasing returns aspects of the 
Ethier model.  This property of the Ethier model also led to its adoption as the theoretical basis 
of one of the fundamental models of endogenous growth (e.g. Romer, 1987). 
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In equation (2), intermediate goods x are indexed over n varieties.  We assume 
symmetric and homothetic cost structures for the production of intermediate 
goods.  In particular,  
 
 [ ]( )i i mc x a bx p= +  (3) 
 
where pm  is the price of factor bundles used for the production of manufactured 
goods.  The technology for production of factor bundles m is itself a standard 
neoclassical technology. 
 ( , )m mm h L S=  (4) 
 
The economy, expressed in terms of the transformation technology for W and m, 
is strictly Heckscher-Ohlin.  As such, we have full employment of factors. 
 
 m WL L L= +  (5) 
 m WS S S= +  (6) 
 
It follows that in reduced form we can specify the transformation frontier 
between bundles and wheat as an artifact of equations (1), (4), (5), and (6).  This 
is formalized as equation (7). 
 
 ( )  0, 0m g W g g¢ ¢¢= < <  (7) 
 
The market for intermediates is assumed to be monopolistically 
competitive.  Given our specification of equations (2), (3) and (4), we are 
therefore able to specify the transformation technology from intermediate 
bundles to final manufactured goods in terms of a multiplier q that is a function 
of the total scale of domestic and foreign production of intermediates m and m*, 
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and also of a Samuelson trading cost coefficient t.  This is expressed formally in 
equations (8) and (9). (Francois and Nelson, 2002). 
 
 ( , *, ) 0, 0, 0, 0
*
m m
m m
¶q ¶q ¶q
q = q t > > > <
¶ ¶ ¶t
 (8) 
 sM m= q  (9) 
 
The price of intermediate bundles m can be expressed as a function of 
our location on the transformation curve between m and W.  Combined with 
average cost pricing of manufactured intermediates, we can then, in turn, specify 
the supply price of manufactured goods in terms of the multiplier q and the price 
of intermediates.   
 
 ( ) 1mp h
-¢= -  (10) 
 1 1( )M mp p h
- -¢= q = - q  (11) 
 
To close our model of the economy, we assume homothetic preferences.  
As such, the expenditure share of manufactured goods a will be a function of the 
relative price of manufactured goods pM , while demand will be a function of 
relative prices and total income G.  Income will itself be a function of relative 
prices and the trading cost. 
 
 ( ),  0
MM p
j p ja = <  (12) 
 ( , )MG G p= t  (13) 
 ( , )dM Z G= a  (14) 
 
To explore the impact of deeper integration as proxied by falls in the 
trading cost coefficient t, we first totally differentiate the supply side of the 
system (equations 7, 8, 9, 10, 11).  This yields equations (15)-(19). 
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 ,ˆ ˆW mW m= e  (15) 
 , , * ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ*m mm mq q q tq = e + e +e t  (16) 
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¢
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¢
¢¢
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¢
 (18) 
 ˆˆ ˆsM m= q +  (19) 
 
Throughout ˆ x = ¶x / x  indicates a proportional change in x, while 
( )( ), / /x y x y y xe = ¶ ¶  indicates the elasticity of x with respect to y. 
We also differentiate the demand side of the system, again expressing our 
results in percent change terms.  From equations (12)-(14), we obtain equations 
(20)-(22). 
 ,ˆ ˆMp Mpaa = e  (20) 
 , ,ˆ ˆ ˆMG p M GG p t= e + e t  (21) 
 , , ˆˆ ˆ
d
Z Z GM Ga= e a + e  (22) 
 
We start with a symmetric equilibrium to stress the point that even 
between identical economies, there are linkages between trade, productivity and 
production patterns, and wages in division of labor models.  As such, rest of 
world values mirror home country values, and we can focus on home demand 
and supply conditions.  Departure from symmetry is then discussed afterwards.  
With appropriate substitutions, we solve for the change in the size of the 
manufacturing sector ˆ m .  First, we substitute equation (17) into equations (20) 
and (21).  This in turn we substitute into equation (22), yielding equation (23).  
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On the supply-side, we substitute equation (16) into (19), yielding equation (24). 
 
 , , * ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ*
s
m mM m m mq q q t= e + e +e t +  (24) 
 
Setting equation (23) equal to equation (24), we then obtain equation (25). 
 
 ( )
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In the fully symmetric equilibrium, where m=m*, we can simplify equation (25) 
and re-arrange it as follows: 
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æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
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 (26) 
 
There are three basic ambiguities that arise in signing of equation (26).  First, the 
impact of trading costs on GDPeG,t is in general ambiguous, though in a 
symmetric equilibrium we may assume this is negative.  Second, the impact of the 
price of manufactures on GDP eG,p M is also generally ambiguous, both in the 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin model and here.  On the demand side, we have a final 
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ambiguity related to the impact of price changes on expenditure shares ea,p M .  
While the impact on quantity demanded is direct with sufficient assumptions 
about normality of demand, the expenditure share may itself rise or fall as a 
result.  This last effect is stressed by Lovely and Nelson (2000).  The first two will 
depend on the underlying net export position of the economy, and the strength 
of agglomeration/scale effects, with a trade-off emerging between scale effects 
and terms of trade effects.  (See Francois 1994 on this trade-off outside the 
symmetric case).  A further ambiguity follows when we depart from symmetric 
equilibria.  As stressed by Francois and Nelson (2002), changes in m may lead to 
an increase or decrease in m*, further complicating the signing of a more general 
version of equation (26).   
 With an underlying Heckscher-Ohlin technology for m and W, relative 
wages for skilled and unskilled labor wS  and wU will be a function of the size of 
the manufacturing sector as indexed by m, while the impact of globalization 
(through trading costs t) on m will be ambiguous given equation (26). 
 
 ( )S
U
f m
w
W = =
w
 (27) 
 , , ,
0
( ) (?)
m mW t W t
<
>
e =e e
+
 (28) 
At the same time, there is a direct impact of globalization on productivity, with q 
rising with a fall in trading costs and the consequent rise in cross-border gross 
trade in intermediates, even in an otherwise symmetric equilibrium where we 
sterilize resource shifts.   
In summary, deeper integration implies unambiguous rising productivity 
in the manufacturing sector, driving changes in relative wages related to 
consequent resource shifts.  These wage effects are themselves theoretically 
ambiguous. Formally: 
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Observation 1: Within the class of global division-of-labor (i.e. 
monopolistic competition) models, there is a positive structural link 
between global integration (through rising trade and investment levels) 
and manufacturing productivity.   
 
Observation 2: Within the class of global division-of-labor (i.e. 
monopolistic competition) models, there is an ambiguous structural link 
between global integration (through rising trade and relative wages) and 
the skill premium.  The direction of this link is ultimately an empirical 
question. 
 
3. SOME EMPIRICS 
In this section we examine the empirical relationship between trade, productivity, 
and the skill premium in an effort to evaluate the usefulness of Ethier-type 
models of the international division of labor as a framework for thinking about 
the trade-wages link.  As with the macroeconomic predictions of endogenous 
growth theory and the new geography, both of which are based on essentially the 
same model as that developed in the previous section, compelling empirical tests 
are hard to conceive.  The model in the previous section suggests that 
globalization, however defined, implies an expanded division of labor, potentially 
increasing demand for one class of labor relative to another.  Thus we need to 
examine the relationship between increased trade (indirectly measuring the 
increased division of labor) and the relative wage.  However, the model implies 
that this relationship is mediated by increased efficiency as a function of the 
expanding division of labor. Furthermore, because the relationship is derived in a 
comparative static fashion, there is a benefit from examining it in a time series 
framework that allows us to look at long and short run components.  Before 
reporting our results, we first describe the data and the technique. 
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Our basic data on wages come from Baldwin and Cain (2000).9  We focus 
on unskilled workers defined as those workers possessing less than high school 
education (W ); and skilled workers defined as high school education or more 
(Ws1); and skilled workers defined as greater than high school education (Ws2).  
Logs of these series are shown in Figure 1.  From these variables, we constructed 
two measures of the skill premium (i.e. the wage of skilled workers relative to 
unskilled workers): SP1 = Ws1/Wu and SP2 = Ws2/Wu.  Figure 2 shows logs of 
these series. The proximate spur to the boom in analysis of these series is 
illustrated in Figure 2, where we see both measures of the skill premium fall until 
about 1980, and then rise fairly dramatically. 
Our theoretical discussion suggests that there is a link between an 
expanding global division of labor and the relative wage in which trade plays a 
fundamental part.  Although our wage data come entirely from the US, the 
specification of intensity of division of labor in the model is defined with respect 
to the world market as a whole.10  Thus, we choose to focus on variables that we 
hope to be reasonable measures of the extent of the global division of labor.  In 
the model, the increasing returns at the macroeconomic level derive from the 
presence of greater variety in intermediate inputs, suggesting that we should 
focus on industrial intermediates.11  However, the available data are far from 
perfect measures of this variable.  Although we considered a number of variables, 
we ultimately define intermediate trade as either intermediate trade excluding oil 
and intermediate trade excluding oil and motor vehicles.12  In both cases we 
define this variable as total world trade in the category as a percentage of world 
                                                 
9 These measures are derived from the annual March Current Population Survey, produced by the 
Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Baldwin and Cain (2000) provide details 
of the construction of these variables. 
10 This, in a sense is the fundamental point of Ethier’s (1982) paper which, after all, is called: 
“National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade”. 
11 Note that this is essentially what Borjas/Ramey focus on, however, where they use net trade in 
intermediates for the US, the theoretical framework motivating our analysis suggests total global 
trade in intermediate goods. 
12 These data are taken from the United Nation’s COMTRADE database, as further processed 
and reported in the Global Trade Analysis Project database, version 5.2. 
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GDP.  All variables are analyzed in logarithmic form and are illustrated in Figure 
3 (intermediate good trade). 
Finally, the distinctive element of the Ethier model, and the element that 
renders the link between trade and the relative wages ambiguous, is the link 
between trade and macroeconomic productivity via the increased division of 
labor (i.e. Young-style roundaboutness).  There is, of course, a sizable literature 
on the link between trade and growth focussing primarily on exports and, 
sometimes, on exports and imports separately.13  In that analysis, trade is usually 
seen as affecting growth by its effect on capital accumulation.  However, where 
that literature is interested in growth per se, the Ethier model suggests that the link 
is between trade and increased productivity.  Thus, we attempt to introduce this 
element by including a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) in our analysis.  
Specifically, we consider measures of TFP for both manufacturing as a whole and 
for intermediate goods.14  These series are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Our model predicts that: (1) there should be a long run equilibrium 
relationship between international trade, TFP, and the skill premium, (2) within 
that relationship trade shocks should raise productivity, and (3) the effect of trade 
on wages is mediated by its effect on productivity and theoretically ambiguous. 
As we have just described, we have two alternative variables for each theoretical 
variable. We examine all 8 possible three variable systems consisting of one of the 
trade variables, one of the productivity variables and one of the wage variables. In 
each case we test for a long run relationship by looking for co-integration 
                                                 
13 Most of this literature focuses on developing countries (for a survey, see Ahmad, 2001). 
However, a number of papers have examined the case of industrial countries as well (e.g. Kunst 
and Marin, 1989; Marin, 1992, and Yamada, 1998).  In addition, the recent paper by Atesoglu and 
Vilasuso (2003) focuses exclusively on the United States.  The earlier work pretty uniformly found 
little evidence of export-led growth, but more recent studies, based on newer econometric 
methodologies, produce more supportive results.  Commonly these more recent studies find 
evidence of a two-way relationship between exports and growth. 
14 We use two measures of productivity, both taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Major 
Sector Multifactor Productivity Series.  These are productivity for intermediate goods, as proxied 
by industrial machinery and computer equipment (Series Id:  MPU323503 (B),  Multifactor 
Productivity Index 1996 = 100,  Ind. Machinery,Comp.Eq.SIC35), and all manufacturing (Series 
Id:  MPU300003 (B), Multifactor Productivity Index, 1996 = 100, Manufacturing). 
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between the three series. We test for whether trade shocks raise productivity via 
tests on the coefficients of any existing cointegrating relationships and also by 
examining the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) of the various 
three variable systems. To investigate whether the relationship between trade and 
wages is mediated by productivity we compare the GIRFs of the three variable 
system to those of a two variable system consisting only of trade and wages. 
 Practically, the first step in testing for cointegration is to determine the 
order of integration of the series under study. We do so both by using augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, where the null hypothesis is that the series contains a 
unit root, and KPSS tests where the null hypothesis is that the series is stationary. 
The results of these tests are presented in Table1. Panel A shows that the ADF 
tests fails to reject the hypothesis that each of the 6 variables has a unit root in 
their log levels, but rejects the same hypothesis in their growth rates. These 
results are mirrored almost exactly by the KPSS tests in panel B where the 
hypothesis that the log levels of the variables is stationary is rejected in all 6 cases, 
while the same hypothesis applied to the growth rates cannot be rejected in 5 of 
the 6 cases. The only place the tests conflict is on the question of whether the 
growth rate of our first wage variable is stationary (ADF says yes, KPSS says no). 
As a “tiebreaker” we use a Phillips-Perron test, which rejects the null of a unit 
root in the growth rate of this variable at the 0.01 level. We thus conclude that all 
6 of our variables are difference stationary and proceed to test for the 
cointegration between trade productivity and wages that our model implies. 
 Our cointegration tests use the now standard Johansen technique. We 
assume there is an intercept both in the cointegrating regression and in the VAR. 
We use 4 lagged difference terms in the VAR. Table 2 shows that in all eight 
possible three variable systems, the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors is 
rejected while the null hypothesis of a single co-integrating vector is never 
rejected. This is strong evidence in favor of our model’s prediction that there 
should be a long run relationship between trade, productivity and wages. In each 
of the 8 cases there is a linear combination of the three variables that is 
stationary, meaning that there is an equilibrium relationship imposing limits on 
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their individual movements. 
 As noted, the one more specific prediction of our model is that 
innovations to trade should raise productivity.  We can test this hypothesis by 
means of testing coefficients in the single cointegrating relation found for each 
three variable system. The coefficients of the cointegrating relationship are not 
identified and require some normalization to interpret them. Generally, one of 
the variables has its coefficient normalized to 1.0. In our case we normalize the 
coefficient on productivity to 1.0 and then arrange the normalized coefficients to 
show the relationship between trade, wages and productivity. This is done for 
each of the 8 three variable systems and the results are reported in Table 3. The 
Johansen procedure also provides asymptotic standard errors for the normalized 
coefficients and from these we can conduct asymptotic significance tests.  
 In all 8 systems the long run effect of trade on productivity (controlling 
for the effect of wages) is estimated to be positive and in 6 of the 8 cases the 
positive effect is significant at the 0.01 level. This lends further support to our 
model in that we find very strong evidence that increased trade raises 
productivity. 
 We now turn to the dynamic responses to shocks in our three variable 
systems. Given that in each case, the variables are all I(1) and there is a 
cointegrating relationship between them, the Granger representation theorem 
states that the data can be validly modeled as a vector error correction (VEC) 
model. A VEC is a VAR in the growth rates with the lagged cointegrating 
relation included in each equation of the system as an additional explanatory 
variable. Put more precisely, let the data at time t be written in the k ´ 1 vector Xt 
and let a be the vector of cointegrating coefficients. Then the cointegrating 
relationship can be written as tXa ¢ . The VEC for these data can be written 
as: ( )
tititt
XXX å +D+¢=D -- eqag 1  where the iq   terms are k ´ k coefficient 
matrices and  g  is a k ´ 1 coefficient vector which shows how the growth rates 
of the variables respond to movements in the cointegrating relation. 
 We estimate a VEC representation for all 8 of our three variable systems 
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using 4 lags of the growth rates. In each case we then study the responses of each 
variable in the system to a shock in one of the variables. We are especially 
interested in how productivity responds to trade shocks. We compute generalized 
impulse response functions which show the effect of a time t innovation in one 
series on the behavior of another series (or itself) at times t + i. The GIRF 
accomplishes this in a way that does not depend on the ordering of the series. We 
also consider the cumulative effect of a shock via the accumulated GIR’s of a 
system. These are simply the moving sum of the past impulse responses. Table 4 
presents summaries of these accumulated GIR’s. In particular, note that in all 8 
cases, the cumulative effect of a trade shock on productivity is positive, 
reinforcing the result found above using the normalized cointegrating 
coefficients.  
  All in all there is a very consistent qualitative pattern in the accumulated 
GIR’s across the 8 estimated VEC systems in that the sign of the accumulated 
effects do not vary across models.  From the table we see that, wage shocks raise 
productivity and lower trade, productivity shocks raise productivity and lower 
trade, and that besides raising productivity, trade shocks also raise wages (the skill 
premium).  Thus even when allowing for the possible mediating effect of 
productivity, trade innovations are associated with higher skill premiums. 
 Given that all 8 VEC’s have the same pattern of results, we choose one 
particular system to discuss in more detail.  Figure 5 shows the 10 period GIRFs 
for the three variable systems LWINTT2 LTFPINT LSP2 while Figure 6 shows 
the moving sum of those responses (i.e. the accumulated GIR).  Table 5 provides 
information about how important movements in one variable are in explaining 
variation in the other variables by reporting on the eight period variance 
decomposition of the system. 
 Variance decompositions attribute fluctuations in one of the variables 
into the fractions attributable to shocks to each of the variables in the system. 
This is a way to gauge the overall importance of innovations in a variable to the 
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evolution of the variables in the model.15  We can see from the Table that trade 
shocks are relatively important for explaining movements in productivity (the 
average fraction of variation explained is around 40%), while they are less 
important for explaining movements in the skill premium (the average fraction of 
variation explained is around 11%). The main factor explaining variation in the 
skill premium is its own innovations as innovations to the skill premium explain 
around 75% of its own variation. 
 The final prediction of our model to consider here is whether the 
estimated effect of trade on wages would be different if the productivity variable 
was excluded.   To address this issue we take the three variables system analyzed 
above and drop the productivity variable (LTFPINT) leaving a bivariate trade - 
wages (LWINTT2 LSP2) model.  Figures 7 and 8 present the GIRF’s and 
accumulated GIR’s for this bivariate VEC while Table 6 displays the 8 period 
variance decompositions.  It is clear that ignoring productivity gives an inflated 
notion of the size of the effect trade shocks have on wages. The GIRF here 
shows that the effect of a trade shock on wages increases over time in a way not 
seen in the three variable model.  This response causes the accumulated effects of 
a trade shock to be over 50% higher in the bivariate case than in the trivariate 
case. The variance decompositions show an even greater disparity in that the 
fraction of the variation in wages explained by trade shocks rises to an average of 
around 35% in the bivariate model compared to around 11% in our preferred 
trivariate model. These results show that bivariate evidence common in the 
literature of the effect of trade on wages should be taken with a grain (or two) of 
salt. 
 
                                                 
15 Variance decompositions use the Cholesky orthogonalization and do depend on the ordering of 
the data. Here we use the ordering implied by our theory that Trade shocks causally come first 
followed by productivity and then wage shocks. 
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 4.  SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have argued that more attention needs to be given to North-
North trade  in the literature on trade and labor markets.  Such trade is 
considerably larger in magnitude than the North-South trade that implicitly 
motivates much of the existing research.  In this context, we follow an expanding 
body of research on directions of trade in suggesting that frameworks alternative 
to the strict HOS model and its extensions should be explored.  Thus, in section 
I we develop such a model, which has the implication that trade volumes are a 
potentially important explanatory variable when attempting to understand the 
link between globalization and wages.  Section II presents an exploratory 
empirical study of this relationship.  The key check on the plausibility of the 
model is the link between trade and TFP.  If this relationship did not appear, we 
would take this as strong evidence against the Ethier model, or at least our 
empirical implementation of the model.  In fact, this implication of the model 
receives strong support from our data.  Turning to the link between trade and the 
skill premium, the model makes no prediction except that there should be a 
relationship.  Here, again conditional on our empirical implementation (in 
particular the highly aggregate nature of the data we use), we find evidence of a 
positive relationship between trade and the skill premium.  Interestingly, we find 
that the relationship is weaker than would be implied without taking into account 
the relationship between trade and TFP.  Nonetheless, the magnitude of the 
effect is larger than most existing estimates, and appears to be larger than the 
profession’s aggregate prior on that relationship.  
We interpret our results not as definitive, but rather as suggestive of a 
need for additional work combining models of North-North trade with time 
series methods.  As such, this paper should be viewed as exploratory.  We see it 
as contributing to the growing body of research (in regional economics and 
macroeconomics, as well as trade) suggesting that models based on explicit 
attention to division of labor issues play an essential role in motivating and 
framing empirical research on trade. 
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Skill Premium, 1967-1996
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Figure 5. GIRF's for the system LWINTT2 LTFPINT LSP2
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Figure 6. Accumulated generalized responses for the system LWINTT2 LTFPINT LSP2
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Figure 7. GIRF's for the system LWINTT2 LSP2
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Table 1: Order of Integration of the Variables 
 
A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests ¹ 
 
Variable      ADF t-statistic testing Ho: Variable has a unit root 
       
   Levels   1st Differences    
 
LSP1    -1.01         -6.14***    
 
LSP2     0.47        -5.46*** 
 
LWINTT1   -1.59        -4.79*** 
 
LWINTT2   -1.51        -4.81*** 
 
LTFPMFG    0.69        -4.89***  
 
LTFPINT   2.10        -3.67** 
 
 
B: KPSS Tests ² 
 
Variable      ADF t-statistic testing Ho: Variable is stationary 
       
   Levels  1st Differences    
 
LSP1     0.61**       0.47**   
 
LSP2     0.53**       0.44     
 
LWINTT1    0.65**       0.38    
 
LWINTT2    0.64**       0.39    
 
LTFPMFG    0.69**       0.32                
 
LTFPINT    0.70**      0.45 
 
 
1. Lag length chosen by Schwartz Information Criterion 
2.  Spectral estimation is via the Bartlett kernel, bandwidth is automatically 
selected using the Newey-West criterion. ** indicates rejection of the null at the 
0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level. All tests performed using EVIEWS4. 
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Table 2: Cointegration Tests 
 
System  Statistic  Ho: r=0 Ho: r<=1 Ho: r<=2 
 
LWINTT1 
LTFPINT Trace   39.01***  8.16  1.41 
LSP1  Max-Eigen  30.86***  6.73  1.41 
 
LWINTT1  
LTFPINT Trace   52.98*** 12.54  1.57 
LSP2  Max-Eigen  40.44*** 10.97  1.57 
 
LWINTT1 
LTFMFG Trace   30.72**  8.85  0.81 
LSP1  Max-Eigen  21.87**  8.05  0.81 
 
LWINTT1  
LTFPMFG Trace   36.25**  12.18  0.01 
LSP2  Max-Eigen  24.06**  12.17  0.01 
 
LWINTT2 
LTFPINT Trace   40.12***  7.96  1.46 
LSP1  Max-Eigen  32.16***  6.49  1.46 
 
LWINTT2  
LTFPINT Trace   57.27*** 13.49  1.86 
LSP2  Max-Eigen  43.78*** 11.63  1.86 
 
LWINTT2 
LTFMFG Trace   30.81** 9.03  0.93 
LSP1  Max-Eigen  21.77**  8.10  0.93 
 
LWINTT2  
LTFPMFG Trace   35.31**  11.86  0.04 
LSP2  Max-Eigen  23.44**  11.81  0.04 
 
 
*** indicates rejection of the null at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level. All tests 
assume an intercept both in the cointegrating relation and the VAR, and use 4 
lagged difference terms. All tests performed using EVIEWS4 
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Table 3:   The (normalized) Cointegrating Relations  
  from the 8 Three Variables Systems 
 
LTFPINT = 0.220 LWINTT1 + 1.944 LSP1 + 3.100       
        (0.033)                    (0.061) 
 
LTFPINT = 0.411 LWINTT1 + 1.722 LSP2 +  2.573  
        (0.021)                  (0.047)  
 
LTFPMFG = 0.029 LWINTT1 +  0.694 LSP1  +  4.171   
             (0.021)                    (0.042)  
 
LTFPMFG = 0.117 LWINTT1 +   0.603  LSP2  + 3.952  
            (0.018)                     (0.038)  
 
LTFPINT   = 0.219 LWINTT2   +  1.986 LSP1 +  3.125   
           (0.035)                  (0.062)  
 
LTFPINT = 0.418 LWINTT2 +   1.789 LSP2 +  2.597   
          (0.023)                   (0.047)  
 
LTFPMFG  =  0.029 LWINTT2   +   0.711 LSP1 +  4.168439  
   (0.021)           (0.042)  
          
LTFPMFG = 0.114 LWINTT2 +   0.629 LSP2   +  3.962340  
            (0.019)                     (0.039)  
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 
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Table 4:  Summarizing the 10 period Accumulated  
  Generalized Impulse Responses for all 8 VEC Models: 
 
Accumulated Response of TFP to a generalized TRADE shock:       positive 8 of 8 times 
 
Accumulated Response of TFP to a generalized SKILL  shock:       positive 8 of 8 times 
 
Accumulated Response of TFP to a generalized own shock:       essentially zero 8 of 8 times 
 
 
Accumulated Response of SKILL to a generalized TRADE shock:   positive 8 of 8 times 
 
Accumulated Response of SKILL to a generalized TFP shock:       positive 8 of 8 times 
 
Accumulated Response of SKILL to a generalized own shock:       positive 8 of 8 time 
 
 
Accumulated Response of TRADE to a generalized TFP shock:       negative 8 of 8 times 
 
Accumulated Response of TRADE to a generalized SKILL shock:   negative 8 of 8 times 
 
Accumulated Response of TRADE to a generalized own shock:       positive 8 of 8 time 
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Table 5:  Variance Decompositions for the system  
  LWINTT2 LTFPINT LSP2 ¹ 
 
 Variance Decomposition of LWINTT2:     
 Period      S.E.  LWINTT2 LTFPINT LSP2 
     
 1  0.078465  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.122700  83.46771  12.89969  3.632606 
 3  0.123035  83.25832  13.05999  3.681693 
 4  0.126809  82.11587  14.19881  3.685324 
 5  0.133749  78.76291  16.64622  4.590868 
 6  0.143970  69.12483  14.62987  16.24530 
 7  0.174415  47.86192  18.21917  33.91890 
 8  0.206643  34.09729  19.82079  46.08192 
 
     
 Variance Decomposition of LTFPINT:     
 Period     S.E.              LWINTT2 LTFPINT    LSP2 
     
 1  0.015144  12.90740  87.09260  0.000000 
 2  0.019241  25.18999  71.84871  2.961300 
 3  0.027162  53.41773  42.41768  4.164591 
 4  0.038319  67.85970  24.11315  8.027146 
 5  0.045901  62.55241  17.08795  20.35964 
 6  0.059873  42.01794  15.25321  42.72885 
 7  0.074113  34.34492  14.07197  51.58311 
 8  0.088870  27.96180  14.95111  57.08708 
 
     
 Variance Decomposition of LSP2:     
 Period      S.E.  LWINTT2 LTFPINT LSP2 
     
 1  0.016495  25.53232  0.470570  73.99711 
 2  0.023270  19.50577  6.701423  73.79281 
 3  0.039108  7.489355  13.62976  78.88088 
 4  0.047747  6.354028  16.94645  76.69953 
 5  0.059090  6.973182  16.60466  76.42216 
 6  0.069522  7.601041  16.95515  75.44381 
 7  0.077894  7.742931  17.48266  74.77441 
 8  0.087239  8.052522  16.57626  75.37121 
 
     
1. VDC uses the  Cholesky decomposition with ordering: LWINTT2 LTFPINT 
LSP2  
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Table 6: Variance Decompositions for the system LWINTT2 LSP2 ¹  
  
  
Variance Decomposition of LWINTT2:    
  
Period      S.E.  LWINTT2 LSP2 
    
 1  0.111922  100.0000  0.000000 
 2  0.183980  98.83316  1.166843 
 3  0.203630  98.82728  1.172722 
 4  0.209861  98.68379  1.316206 
 5  0.216201  95.83598  4.164016 
 6  0.222102  94.83065  5.169350 
 7  0.232207  94.97314  5.026860 
 8  0.242121  95.34102  4.658985 
  
 
   
 Variance Decomposition of LSP2:    
 
 Period      S.E.  LWINTT2 LSP2 
    
 1  0.019443  19.36375  80.63625 
 2  0.023227  27.02928  72.97072 
 3  0.028213  23.77480  76.22520 
 4  0.031731  28.43304  71.56696 
 5  0.035772  34.37086  65.62914 
 6  0.040383  43.55979  56.44021 
 7  0.046262  53.01793  46.98207 
 8  0.051629  60.78768  39.21232 
 
 
 
1. VDC uses the  Cholesky decomposition with ordering: LWINTT2 LSP2 
 
 
 
 
